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Distributed H∞ Estimation Resilient to Biasing Attacks
V. Ugrinovskii
Abstract—We consider the distributedH∞ estimation problem
with an additional requirement of resilience to biasing attacks. An
attack scenario is considered where an adversary misappropriates
some of the observer nodes and injects biasing signals into
observer dynamics. The paper proposes a procedure for the
derivation of a distributed observer which endows each node with
an attack detector which also functions as an attack compensating
feedback controller for the main observer. Connecting these
controlled observers into a network results in a distributed
observer whose nodes produce unbiased robust estimates of the
plant. We show that the gains for each controlled observer in
the network can be computed in a decentralized fashion, thus
reducing vulnerability of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of understanding possible attacker’s strategies
and developing suitable countermeasures receives consider-
able attention in the literature dedicated to designing con-
trol and filtering systems resilient to malicious interference.
The approaches of the game and optimization theories are
conventional in this area [1], [8], [27], [30], [5], [32], al-
though they often tend to overestimate the attacker, assuming
that the adversary has sufficient resources to collect detailed
measurements and implement a sophisticated attack policy.
For instance, the recent Byzantine models of the adversarial
behavior allow the adversarial nodes to possess complete
knowledge about the graph topology and the plant dynamics,
i.e., an adversarial node knows the measurements received by
the healthy nodes [11]. This has undesirable consequences of
having to endow the network with a substantial redundancy,
in order to guarantee that it is able to sustain multiple
simultaneous attacks [3], [7], [11].
There have been suggestions that robust control techniques
could provide an alternative framework for optimizing the
system performance in the presence of an attacker [4]. In-
deed, robust control models are quite flexible and can handle
large numbers of uncertainty inputs. In this regard they may
offer a certain flexibility over the Byzantine model in that
they are generally less restrictive about the number of nodes
affected by the adversary. However, robustness specifications
differ significantly from requirements for resilience to strategic
attacks [32], which could make the robust control approach
too conservative as the means for accommodating strategic
intentions of a malicious attacker [7].
In this paper we show that this drawback of the robustness
methodology can be overcome if the features of the attack
which make it distinct from benign disturbances are properly
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accounted. To this end, we consider the so-called biasing
attacks [21] which admit a simple mathematical description,
and yet capture a nontrivial type of misappropriation attacks
on distributed networks. To be concrete, the paper focuses on
the problem of resilient distributed estimation using sensor
networks in the presence of a strategic adversary who mis-
appropriates a number of sensing nodes and injects a biasing
signal into the observers [6], [21]. To interfere with operation
of the network the intruder first infiltrates the network, by
breaching the cyber layer of security. Once the adversary has
penetrated the cyber security barrier and has gained access to
the estimation algorithm at the misappropriated node, it mod-
ifies it by injecting biasing signals. In this regard, our attack
scenario resembles that of the Stuxnet computer worm [18].
The injected biasing signals cause the misappropriated ob-
servers to produce erroneous estimates of the plant. Also, the
bias spreads through the network interconnections causing a
‘domino’ effect of cascading errors, forcing the entire observer
network to fail. To achieve this, the attacker does not need any
knowledge of the system or the plant.
We show that information collected by sensors within a
typical network of state observers coupled in a diffusive
manner [13] is sufficient for discovering and disarming such
biasing misappropriation attacks. To demonstrate this, we
propose a distributed observer architecture which augments
the observer network with an additional layer consisting
of a network of interconnected attack detecting controllers.
These controllers utilize the same noisy innovation information
which is used for state estimation. based on this information,
they estimate an extended vector of observer errors and use it
for feedback. We show that this feedback control policy has
an asymptotically negligible effect on the dynamics of healthy
observers. However at the compromised nodes, the controller
outputs track the biasing attack inputs; this enables to negate
the attack. The controllers are constructed within the H∞
control framework. The choice of the framework is consistent
with the original state estimation objective and facilitates the
performance analysis of the resilient estimation algorithm.
Controlling the plant observers via feedback to make them
resilient to the biasing behavior of misappropriated nodes is
the main distinction of this paper from our previous work [6].
As another distinct feature, the paper considers the most
general biasing attack scenario in which the attacker seeks to
bias both the state observer and the attack detector. Indeed,
the attacker who has gained access to the data processing
algorithm will likely to temper with both the state observer and
security devices. Hence, the attack detection algorithm must
also be made resilient to attacks, in the same manner as the
plant observer. Although the paper considers this problem in
the context specific to misappropriation attacks on distributed
observers, we believe the problem is important in general
2since security devices cannot not be assumed to be immune
to malicious interference.
Starting from the seminal work [15], distributed compu-
tations are widely used in the literature on distributed es-
timation. In addition to solving the main task of obtaining
state estimates of the plant, in many algorithms, sensor nodes
must communicate to compute parameters of their observers,
such as error covariance matrices, innovation gains, etc [15].
Such distributed computations present obvious security risk,
and hardening of distributed algorithms is a subject of current
research [20]. In this paper, we approach this issue differently,
aiming to achieve a computational autonomy of the observers.
Namely, in the proposed method, each observer node computes
its observer in a decentralized fashion, without communicating
with other nodes. The method is based on the distributed
observer design approach proposed in [29]. It involves an
initial setup step during which certain auxiliary parameters
are computed which are then assigned to the nodes. This
initial step is carried out centrally when the network is offline,
hence it does not jeopardize the system security. Also, the
knowledge of the plant observed is not required at this stage,
since these parameters are computed only using characteristics
of the communication network and the desired performance
characteristics. Each sensor node then utilizes these auxiliary
parameters to compute its node observer autonomously. The
plant model must be used at this stage, of course. This
methodology contrasts the methodology used in our previous
work [6] which relied on solving certain linear matrix inequal-
ities coupled among the nodes to compute attack detectors.
In summary, the main contribution and features of the paper
are as follows:
(a) We introduce a new class of networked attack detectors
that use feedback to suppress biasing attacks on distributed
observer networks.
(b) Despite the proposed methodology of resilient estimation
is based on the approach of H∞ control, it distinguishes
between benign disturbances and attack signals.
(c) Formally, our approach does not limit the number of nodes
subjected to simultaneous biasing attacks. Essentially, ev-
ery node is treated conservatively as a potential target.
However, trusted nodes can be easily accommodated in
our formulation. This will only simplify the system model
used in the derivation of the attack detector and controller.
(d) The proposed methodology identifies the nodes subjected
to biasing attacks, regardless whether the adversary tar-
gets the state observer or its attack detecting feedback
controller, or both.
(e) The node observers compute their parameters in decentral-
ized manner in real time. Only the information about their
states and states of their controllers needs to be shared
through communication channels.
(f) In the special case of an LTI plant and observers, we are
able to provide a deeper insight into feasibility and per-
formance optimization of the proposed resilient observers,
including selecting the best network topology from a set
of candidate topologies.
The preliminary version of the paper has been presented
at the 2018 American Control Conference [26]. Compared
with the conference version, the current version contains a
substantial amount of new material concerned with security
of the proposed attack detecting controllers and performance
optimization over network graphs. Also, the paper includes an
illustrating example which was left out from the conference
version due to space constraints.
The paper begins with presenting a background on dis-
tributed filtering in Section II. Also, in that section we describe
the class of biasing attacks which will be used in the derivation
of our main results. The formal problem statement is given in
Section II-B. The procedure to construct a resilient distributed
observer is described in Section III, and its feasibility and
optimization aspects are discussed in Section III-D. It is
illustrated in Section IV with an example. The conclusions
are given in Section V.
Notation: Rn denotes the real Euclidean n-dimensional
vector space, with the norm ‖x‖ = (x′x)1/2; here the symbol ′
denotes the transpose of a matrix or a vector. The symbol I de-
notes the identity matrix. For real symmetric n×n matrices X
and Y , Y > X (respectively, Y ≥ X) means the matrix Y −X
is positive definite (respectively, positive semidefinite). ⊗ is
the Kronecker product of matrices. ‖x‖X denotes the weighted
norm of x: ‖x‖X = (x′Xx)1/2. diag [C1, . . . , CN ] denotes
the block-diagonal matrix with the matrices C1, . . . , CN as its
diagonal blocks. The notation L2[0,∞) refers to the Lebesgue
space of Rn-valued vector-functions z(.), defined on the time
interval [0,∞), with the norm ‖z‖2 ,
(∫
∞
0
‖z(t)‖2dt)1/2 and
the inner product
∫
∞
0
z′1(t)z2(t)dt. For a causal signal f(t),
f(s) denotes the Laplace transform of f(t).
II. BIASING MISAPPROPRIATION ATTACKS ON
DISTRIBUTED OBSERVERS AND RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED
ESTIMATION
A. Biasing misappropriation attacks on observer networks
Consider a linear time-varying plant
x˙ = A(t)x +B(t)w, x(0) = x0, (1)
subject to an unknown disturbance w ∈ L2[0,∞). The plant
is observed by a network of N sensors. The sensor at node i
collects measurements of the plant, corrupted by disturbances
vi:
yi = Ci(t)x +Di(t)vi, yi ∈ Rpi . (2)
It also exchanges information with other nodes. The com-
munication network forms a directed graph G. Without loss
of generality, the graph is assumed to be connected but not
necessarily strongly connected1. For each node i, let Vi
denotes the set of its neighbors supplying information to that
node. The information received by node i from its neighbor
j ∈ Vi is a pij -dimensional signal
cij =Wij xˆj +Hijvij , (3)
1 This assumption is justified due to Proposition 1 in [22]. The sufficiency
part of that proposition can be easily extended to distributed estimation
problems with a general cost considered in this paper. It implies that if the
network is disconnected, to obtain a solution to the distributed H∞ filtering
problem over such network, it suffices to obtain a solution to the distributed
H∞ filtering problem over each connected network component.
3which contains information about the neighbor j’s estimate
xˆj of the plant state x. The pij × n matrix Wij determines
what information about xˆj(t) node j shares with node i. The
signal vij ∈ L2[0,∞) in (3) represents a channel disturbance.
We think of the matrices Wij , Hij as characteristics of the
network which is considered to be fixed (the motivation for
this will be explained later) and independent of the plant. For
that reason, these matrices are assumed to be constant; cf. [12].
We now make standing assumptions about the coefficients
of the system (1), (2), (3). Throughout the paper, it will be
assumed that the matrix-valued functions A(t), B(t), Ci(t),
Di(t), i = 1, . . . , N , are bounded on the interval [0,∞). Also,
it will be assumed that (Di(t)Di(t)
′)−1 exists and is bounded
on [0,∞) for all i.
In the distributed estimation scenario, the measurements and
the communicated information are processed at the sensor
nodes rather than centrally. Following [15], the following
observers are often considered for this [10], [22], [19], [9]:
˙ˆxi = A(t)xˆi + Li(t)(yi − Ci(t)xˆi)
+
∑
j∈Vi
Kij(t)(cij −Wij xˆi), xˆi(0) = ξi. (4)
Since the plant is time-varying, the coefficients Li, Kij in
(4) are assumed to be time-varying in general. The observers
(4) are coupled. The coupling is especially useful when some
of the pairs (A(t), Ci(t)) are not detectable
2. In this case,
the corresponding nodes face the situation that their filters
may not be able to track the plant if they rely on local
measurements alone. The interconnections provide those nodes
with an information about x(t) which cannot be obtained
from the local measurement yi but can be extracted from the
neighbors’ messages cij [22], [23], [12]. Distributed observers
of the form (4) of course require the system to be detectable as
whole; i.e., the pair (A(t), [C′1, . . . , C
′
N ]
′) must be detectable.
A common problem of distributed estimation is to ensure
that the node estimates xˆi(t) track x(t) (or a part thereof)
with acceptable accuracy and robustness against disturbances
in the plant model, measurements and interconnection chan-
nels; e.g., see [15], [16], [22]. However, the dependency
on information sharing makes a network of observers (4)
vulnerable to attacks seeking to disrupt this task. Common
scenarios of such attacks involve an adversary injecting false
signals into sensor measurements or communicated data [17]
or behaving as a Byzantine fault [11]. The latter behavior
assumes that the adversary can misappropriate some network
nodes and force them to deviate arbitrarily from the pre-
scribed estimation algorithm and transmit different false state
estimates to different neighbors. In this paper, we consider
a similar adversarial behavior, however we assume that the
adversary strategically substitutes the node observers (4) with
their biased versions [6],
˙ˆxi = A(t)xˆi + Li(t)(yi(t)− Ci(t)xˆi)
+
∑
j∈Vi
Kij(t)(cij −Wij xˆi) + Fifi, xˆi(0) = ξi, (5)
2Here we follow the definition of detectability in [14] and say that the pair
(A(t), Ci(t)) is detectable if there exists a gain L˜(t) such that the system
e˙ = (A(t) − L˜(t)Ci(t))e is exponentially stable.
Here fi ∈ Rnfi is an unknown signal representing the
attacker’s input.
When node i is forced to use the observer (5) in lieu of
(4), it generates biased estimates of x(t) closely resembling
those that could be obtained using the true observer (4). These
biased estimates xˆi are then broadcast across the network and
will bias other nodes. To disrupt the network, the adversary
does not need to know the plant dynamics, the measurements
or the communication graph of the system; cf. [11]. Different
from the Byzantine attack modeling, we will not have to
impose a limit on the number of misappropriated nodes, and
can consider the worst-case situation where every node of the
observer network can be biased.
Remark 1: Biasing attacks of this type can occur as a result
of a strategic network intrusion, when the adversary breaches
the cyber security layer and gains access to the observer
algorithm at the misappropriated nodes. In this sense, our
attack model is conceptually different from models of benign
disturbances. Also unlike benign disturbances, in our model
the biasing inputs disturb the observer dynamics, rather than
sensor measurements and/or plant dynamics. 
Since the aim is to obtain an algorithm for fending such
biasing attacks, we assume that the matrices Fi are known to
the defender. That is, the observer (5) is regarded as a model
of the misappropriated attack perceived by the defender. The
defender has several choices for the matrices Fi. For instance,
one can assume Fi = [1, . . . , 1]
′; this choice captures the at-
tack model where the attacker injects a scalar biasing input into
the observer dynamics. Alternatively, we can consider Fi = I;
this means that the adversary may bias each component of the
observer separately.
We assume that the attacker does not seek to change the
network topology. Although it is conceivable that the adversary
may attempt to do so, this type of attack will imminently
expose the attacker. It may not be suitable for the adversary
who wishes to remain covert.
Definition 1 ([6]): A class of admissible biasing inputs,
denoted Fa, consists of causal signals f(t) ∈ Rnf ,
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t), (6)
where the Laplace transform of f1(t), f1(s), has the property
f∞1 = supω |ωf1(jω)|2 < ∞, and f2 ∈ L2[0,∞). In the
decomposition (6), f1(t) represents the biasing component,
and f2(t) is a masking signal; cf. [21].
Note that the attack set Fa includes as a special case
biasing attack inputs which consist of an unknown steady-state
component and an exponentially vanishing masking signal
generated by a low pass filter [21].
The following lemma characterizes the properties of admis-
sible biasing inputs. Its proof is given in [6].
Lemma 1: Let N(s), D(s) be arbitrary real polynomials
with the following properties:
(a) The degree of N(s) is not greater than the degree of D(s),
and so the transfer function G(s) = N(s)D(s) I is proper;
(b) The transfer function (sI + G(s))−1G(s) is stable, and
hence g1 ,
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
∣∣∣ D(jω)jωD(jω)+N(jω)
∣∣∣2 dω <∞ and g2 ,
supω
∣∣∣ jωD(jω)jωD(jω)+N(jω)
∣∣∣2 <∞.
4Then for any signal f ∈ Fa, it holds that ν , fˆ − f ∈
L2[0,∞), where fˆ is the signal whose Laplace transform is
fˆ(s) =
1
s
(sI +G(s))−1G(s)f(s). (7)
The idea behind the decomposition (6) is to separate
‘slow’ parts of f(t) responsible for biasing the observer
(denoted f1(t)) from disturbance-like components (denoted
f2(t)) whose impact can be attenuated provided the observer
is made sufficiently robust to disturbances. According to
Lemma 1, sufficiently slow biasing inputs can be approximated
with a dynamic model, up to a bounded energy error. This
dynamic model will be used in the derivation of a distributed
observer. The idea is to endow the observer with a capacity
to filter out slow biases and be robust against bounded-energy
perturbations and attack approximation errors alike.
Remark 2: In this paper, the attacker is assumed to have no
knowledge of the system, the observers or the network. This
forces the adversary to structure the biasing signal to include
both slow-varying biasing components and disturbance-like
components into the signal f(t). If the slow biasing component
is not included in f(t), and f(t) acts as a disturbance, the
observer will likely attenuate its effect along with the effect
of other noises and disturbances present in the system, since
it is designed to be robust against disturbances. This will
likely reduce effectiveness of the attack. This motivates our
assumption that the admissible biasing inputs must have the
form (6).
In contrast, the Byzantine model does not prescribe attack
inputs to have a particular structure. However, within the
Byzantine model, the attacker is assumed to have knowledge
of the system which is not required in our model. For
instance in [11], the adversarial nodes are assumed “to possess
complete knowledge about the graph topology and the plant
dynamics, i.e., an adversarial node knows the measurements
received by the normal nodes at every time step.” The attack
model (6) does not use this assumption. Also, the Byzantine
model limits the number of adversarial nodes that can be tol-
erated. If this number exceeds a certain threshold, this model
cannot guarantee a successful attack detection. In contrast, our
model does not impose such a threshold, it allows for the
situation when all nodes are corrupted with biasing inputs.
This indicates that both models have place in the theory of
resilient estimation, with their advantages and limitations. 
B. Resilient distributed estimation problem
Our proposal is to modify the observers (4) to include
additional control inputs to suppress biasing misappropriation
attacks. The corresponding model of a misappropriated ob-
server will then be as follows
˙ˆxi = A(t)xˆi + L
r
i (t)(yi(t)− Ci(t)xˆi)− Fiui
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)(cij −Wij xˆi) + Fifi, xˆi(0) = ξi. (8)
The gains Lri (t), K
r
ij(t) of the observer will be computed to
ensure that each xˆi converges to x(t) even in the presence
of admissible attacks. To achieve this resilience property, the
control inputs ui will need to be generated so that when node i
is under attack, ui counters the biasing input fi. Also, when the
node i is not attacked directly, the control ui must not impede
its observer from producing unbiased estimates of x(t). Since
the signals fˆi approximate fi up to an L2-integrable error
νi, this will be achieved by forcing ui to track fˆi instead
of fi while attenuating the errors νi along with the system
disturbances w, vi, vij .
To generate suitable control inputs, each node observer will
be augmented with an output feedback controller
χ˙i = Ac(t)χi + Bc,i(ζi, ζij , ηij , j ∈ Vi) + Fc,ifi − Fc,iui,
ui = Cc,i(t)χi, χi(0) = χi,0. (9)
The second last term in (9) captures the situation where the
attacker interferes with the operation of both the state observer
and the defence layer at the misappropriated node, and the last
term is included to compensate this interference, in the same
manner as this is done for the main observer. The matrices
Fc,i are selected by the defender. Similar to the matrices Fi,
they describe the attack pattern anticipated by the defender.
The inputs to the controller (9) are the innovation signals
ζi = yi − Ci(t)xˆi, ζij = cij −Wij xˆi, (10)
which capture the new information contained in the local
measurements and obtained through communications, respec-
tively. These signals are readily available at node i and will
be used for both estimating the plant and detecting and
compensating biasing attacks. Also, controllers (9) will be
allowed to communicate, and the signals
ηij = Wc,ijχj +Hc,ijvc,ij , (11)
describe the information received from the neighbors’ con-
trollers through imperfect channels containing disturbances
vc,ij ∈ L2[0,∞). For simplicity, we assume that these com-
munications replicate the topology of the original network G,
because in practice the same channels will likely be used to
transmit both cij and ηij .
The problem of resilient estimation is now formally stated.
Let ei(t) = x(t) − xˆi(t) be the state estimation error of the
observer (8) at node i, and define the vector of observer errors
e = [e′1 . . . e
′
N ]
′.
Definition 2: The problem of resilient estimation in this
paper is concerned with constructing a network of controlled
observers (8), (9), to achieve the following:
(i) In the absence of disturbances and when the system is not
under attack, ei and ui must converge to 0 exponentially
as t→∞ at every node i.
(ii) In the presence of uncertainties and/or when the system
is subjected to an attack of class Fa, the network of
controlled observers (8), (9) must ensure that
∫
∞
0 ‖fi −
ui‖2dt <∞ ∀i = 1, . . . , N , and also
∫
∞
0 e
′Pedt <∞,
Here P = P ′ ≥ 0 is a given nN × nN matrix.
We will subsequently show that when fi = 0 and the node i
is not under attack, then the signals ui(t) vanish asymptotically
even in the presence of disturbances. Thus, the asymptotic
behavior of the control signals ui at the compromised nodes
differs from the behavior of similar signals at healthy nodes,
5which makes the signals ui suitable to be used as the attack
indicators. Also according to (ii), in the event of attack, the
estimates produced by the network of controlled observers (8),
(9) will remain unbiased, up to an L2 integrable weighted
error P 1/2e. We will subsequently guarantee a certain level
of disturbance attenuation with respect to this weighted error.
III. DESIGN OF A RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED OBSERVER
A. Observer error dynamics
Consider the dynamics of the estimation errors of the
controlled observers (8),
e˙i = (A(t)− Lri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wij)ei + Fiui
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wijej + B(t)w − Lri (t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Hijvij − Fifi, ei(0) = x0 − ξi. (12)
Also, for every node i, consider a class of admissible biasing
inputs Fa, of dimension nfi . According to Lemma 1, a proper
nfi ×nfi transfer function Gi(s) can be associated with each
class of admissible biasing inputs. Let fˆi(t), νi(t) denote the
corresponding approximation signal defined by (7) and the
corresponding approximation error νi(t) = fˆi(t)−fi(t). From
(7), νi and fˆi are related as fˆi = − 1sGi(s)νi. Consider the
minimal realization of the transfer function − 1sGi(s):
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi, ǫi(0) = 0, (13)
fˆi = Υiǫi,
Next, let us substitute fi = Υiǫi − νi into equation (12) and
combine the dynamics of the systems (12) and (13) into a
system with (e′i, ǫ
′
i)
′ as a state vector,
e˙i = (A(t) − Lri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wij)ei
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wijej − FiΥiǫi + Fiui
+ B(t)w − Lri (t)Di(t)vi −
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Hijvij + Fiνi,
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi, ei(0) = x0 − ξi, ǫi(0) = 0. (14)
The system (14) is driven by the bounded energy disturbances
w, vi, vij and the error signals νi which also have bounded
energy, according to Lemma 1. Each such system is controlled
via the control input ui. The innovation signals (10) can be
written in terms of the variables of the systems (14) as
ζi = Ci(t)ei +Divi, ζij = −Wij(ej − ei) +Hijvij .(15)
Therefore, they can be regarded as outputs of the intercon-
nected large-scale uncertain system comprised of systems (14).
The attack tracking error fi−ui can also be expressed in terms
of this system variables,
ϕi = fi − ui = Υiǫi − ui − νi. (16)
It will be regarded as the system performance output. This
allows to carry out the derivation of the observers (8) and con-
trollers of the form (9) within the H∞ disturbance attenuation
framework. This approach will be pursued in the remainder of
the paper.
B. Feedback attack detector and compensator
Since the biasing inputs fi are not available directly, we
first introduce a distributed filter to estimate the state of the
extended system (14) from the information available at the
nodes, namely from the outputs (10) and interconnections ηij :
˙ˆei = (A(t) − Lri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wij)eˆi
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)ηij + L¯
r
i (ζi − Ci(t)eˆi)
+
∑
j∈Vi
K¯rij(t)(ζij −Wij eˆi + ηij) + F¯ifi − F¯iui,
˙ˆǫi = Ωiǫˆi + Lˇ
r
i (t)(ζi − Ci(t)eˆi)
+
∑
j∈Vi
Kˇrij(t)(ζij −Wij eˆi + ηij) + Fˇifi − Fˇiui, (17)
eˆi(0) = 0, ǫˆi(0) = 0.
Each filter (17) has the desired form of the system (9); i.e.,
χi = [eˆ
′
i, ǫˆ
′
i]
′. To complete the similarity with (9), define the
interconnections (11) between the filters (17) and their outputs
ui as follows:
ηij = Wij eˆj +Hc,ijvc,ij , (18)
ui = Υiǫˆi; (19)
i.e., Wc,ij = [Wij 0], Cc,i = [0 Υi].
The distributed filter comprised of the systems (17)–(19)
will be used to generate control inputs for the underlying
observer (8). As explained previously, it accounts for the
possibility that the adversary may launch a biasing attack on
the controller, along with attacking the original observer. Also,
the feedback is included to compensate for these attacks.
Remark 3: The use of feedback for compensating biasing
attack inputs is the main distinction between the systems (17)–
(19) and similar filters proposed in [6], [25] for detecting
biasing attacks. Thus, the role of the systems (17)–(19) in
this paper shifts from signaling biasing attacks to countering
them.
C. The system design procedure
Consider the errors of the filters (17), zi = ei − eˆi, δi =
ǫi − ǫˆi. It follows from (14) and (16)–(19) that
z˙i = (A(t) − Lˆri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Kˆrij(t)Wij)zi − FˆiΥiδi +Bw
+
∑
j∈Vi
Kˆrij(t)(Wijzj − Hˆij vˆij)− Lˆri (t)Di(t)vi + Fˆiνi,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − Lˇri (t)Ci(t)zi −
∑
j∈Vi
Kˇrij(t)Wijzi − FˇiΥiδi
+
∑
j∈Vi
Kˇrij(t)(Wijzj − Hˆij vˆij)− Lˆri (t)Di(t)vi + Γˇiνi,
zi(0) = x0 − ξi, δi(0) = 0. (20)
6Here we have combined all channel disturbances into the
vectors vˆij = [v
′
ij v
′
c,ij ]
′ and have also used the following
notation:
Lˆri (t) = L
r
i (t) + L¯
r
i (t), Kˆ
r
ij(t) = K
r
ij(t) + K¯
r
ij(t),
Fˆi = Fi + F¯i, Γˇi = Γi + Fˇi, Hˆij = [Hij Hc,ij ]. (21)
The signal ϕi defined in (16) will serve as a performance
output for the system (20), since ϕi = Υiδi − νi.
This notation reveals that the disturbance attenuation proper-
ties of the system comprised of systems (20) can be analyzed
separately from the underlying resilient estimation problem.
This leads us to propose the procedure for obtaining the
coefficients for the observers (8) and the controllers (17)–(19):
1. First, the coefficients Lˆri (t), Kˆ
r
ij(t), Lˇ
r
i (t), Kˇ
r
ij(t) for each
system (20) will be derived. The aim of this derivation is
to guarantee that the filters (17)–(19) are able to track the
signals fˆi. The following specific properties are sought:
(i) When w = 0, vi = 0, and vˆij = 0, j ∈ Vi,
i = 1, . . . , N , and the system is not under attack,
i.e., when fi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N , all signals zi,
δi must decay to 0 exponentially.
(ii) When at least one of the signals w, vi, vˆij or fi is
nonzero, all signals zi, δi must vanish asymptotically,
and the following disturbance attenuation property
must hold
N∑
i=1
∫
∞
0
‖Υiδi‖2dt ≤ γ2
N∑
i=1
(
‖x0 − ξi‖2X−1
i
+
∫
∞
0
(‖w‖2 + ‖vi‖2 + ‖νi‖2 + ∑
j∈Vij
‖vˆij‖2
)
dt
)
.(22)
Here γ2 denotes the level of disturbance attenuation
which reflects a desired tracking accuracy.
2. Next, the coefficients Lri (t), K
r
ij(t) for the controlled dis-
tributed observer (8) will be computed. With the parameters
Lˆri (t), Kˆ
r
ij(t), Lˇ
r
i (t), Kˇ
r
ij(t) obtained in the previous step,
it follows from (22) that the tracking error ϕi = Υiδi − νi
is L2 integrable for every attack input fi ∈ Fa, therefore
the coefficients Lri (t), K
r
ij(t) will be obtained so that the
observer (8) attenuates this additional disturbance, along
with w, vi, vˆij . Essentially, we redesign the original unbi-
ased observers (4) to endow them with robustness against
attack tracking errors. This additional robustness property is
needed to ensure the observers can withstand the transients
generated by the attack canceling controllers.
3. Finally, the remaining coefficients L¯ri (t), K¯
r
ij(t) of the
attack detector (17) will be obtained from (21), using the
values of Lˆri (t), Kˆ
r
ij(t) and L
r
i (t), K
r
ij(t) obtained at the
previous steps.
To implement this procedure, we employ a decentralized
observer synthesis technique from [29]. It has an advantage in
that it the parameters of the nodes observers are computed in
a decentralized fashion. This feature is particularly attractive
in the presence of adversaries, since each node observer can
be computed on-line independently from other nodes, after a
certain initial centralized setup.
The following technical result is adapted from [29]. Con-
sider an interconnected system comprised of the systems
˙˜ei = (A˜i(t)− L˜i(t)C˜i(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
K˜ij(t)W˜ij)e˜i
+
∑
j∈Vi
K˜ij(t)W˜ij e˜j + B˜i(t)w˜i − L˜i(t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Vi
K˜ij(t)H˜ij v˜ij , e˜i(0) = e˜0,i,
subject to L2-integrable disturbances w˜i, vi, v˜ij . The matrix-
valued functions A˜i, C˜i, and B˜i are bounded on [0,∞).
Let X˜i, R˜i, be positive definite symmetric n× n matrices,
and Z˜ij , j ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . . , N , be positive definite symmetric
pij × pij matrices. Also, define the following matrices: U˜ij =
H˜ijH˜
′
ij + Z˜ij > 0,
∆˜i =
∑
j∈Vi
W˜ ′ijU˜
−1
ij Z˜ijU˜
−1
ij W˜ij , (23)
Φ˜ij =


∆˜i, i = j,
−W˜ ′ij U˜−1ij W˜ij , i 6= j, j ∈ Vi,
0 i 6= j, j 6∈ Vi.
(24)
Let R˜ , diag[R˜1, . . . , R˜N ], ∆˜ , diag[∆˜1, . . . , ∆˜N ] and
Φ˜ , [Φ˜ij ]i,j=1,...,N . Next, consider N differential Riccati
equations:
˙˜Yi = A˜iY˜i + Y˜iA
′ + B˜iB˜
′
i − Y˜i
(
C˜i(t)
′(Di(t)Di(t)
′)−1C˜i(t)
+
∑
j∈Vi
W˜ ′ijU˜
−1
ij W˜ij −
1
γ˜2
R˜i
)
Y˜i, Y˜i(0) = X˜
−1
i . (25)
Each equation (25) only depends on the parameters associated
with node i, and can be solved by node i without interacting
with its neighbors.
Lemma 2 (cf. [29]): For a given a positive semidefinite
nN × nN matrix P˜ = P˜ ′ and a constant γ˜ > 0, suppose the
collection of matrices X˜i, R˜i and Z˜ij , j ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . . , N ,
is found which satisfies the conditions:
(a) It holds that
R˜ > P˜ − γ˜2(Φ˜ + Φ˜′ − ∆˜), (26)
(b) The equations (25) have positive definite bounded solu-
tions on [0,∞); i.e., α1iI ≤ Y˜i(t) ≤ α2iI (∃α1i, α2i > 0).
Then, the interconnected system comprised of systems (23)
equipped with the coefficients
L˜i(t) = Y˜i(t)C˜i(t)
′(Di(t)Di(t)
′)−1,
K˜ij(t) = Y˜i(t)W˜
′
ij U˜
−1
ij , (27)
has the following properties:
(i) In the absence of disturbances, e˜i vanish exponentially.
(ii) In the presence of disturbances, each e˜i(t) vanishes
asymptotically, and it holds that
∫
∞
0
e˜′P˜ e˜dt ≤ γ˜2
N∑
i=1
(
‖e˜0,i‖2X˜i
+
∫
∞
0
(‖w˜i‖2 + ‖vi‖2 + ∑
j∈Vij
‖v˜ij‖2
)
dt
)
. (28)
7(iii) In addition, each system (23) with the coefficients de-
fined in (27) attenuates the local disturbances w˜i(t), vi,
v˜ij and its neighbors inputs e˜j , j ∈ Vi:∫
∞
0
e˜′i(t)R˜ie˜i(t)dt
≤ γ˜2
(
‖e˜0,i‖2X˜i +
∫
∞
0
(
‖w˜i(t)‖2 + ‖vi(t)‖2
+
∑
j∈Vi
(‖v˜ij(t)‖2 + ‖e˜j(t)‖2Z−1
ij
)
)
dt
)
. (29)
The proof of the lemma is similar to the proof of Theorem 1
in [29]; it is omitted for brevity.
Remark 4: In Lemma 2, each node exercises its own H∞
filter, and uses its own differential Riccati equation (25)
to compute the filter. The existence of this filter is equiv-
alent to the Riccati equation (25) having a bounded so-
lution. A standard proof of this fact [14] uses a certain
detectability assumption. In our case, it requires the pair
(A˜(t), [C˜i(t)
′, W˜ ′i1, . . . , W˜
′
ijdi
]′) to be detectable; di is the
cardinality of Vi. However, this detectability property is only
needed to prove the necessity of the Riccati equation condition.
Since the conditions of Lemma 2 are sufficient, the above
detectability assumption does not need to be stated explicitly;
it is subsumed in the requirement of the lemma that the
Riccati equation (25) must have a bounded solution. When
this true, each local node error dynamics system is dissipative
with the storage function V˜i = e˜
′
iY˜
−1
i e˜i and the supply rate
γ˜2
(
‖w˜i‖2 + ‖vi‖2 +
∑
j∈Vi
(‖v˜ij‖2 + ‖e˜j‖2Z−1
ij
)
)
− e˜′iR˜ie˜i.
The inequality (26) balances these dissipativity characteristics
of individual nodes in such a way that the error dynamics of
the whole network are dissipative, with the storage function
V˜ =
∑N
i=1 e˜
′
iY˜
−1
i e˜i and the supply rate γ˜
2
∑N
i=1(w˜i‖2 +
‖vi‖2 +
∑
j∈Vi
‖v˜ij‖2)− e˜′P˜ e˜; also, see [29].
Lemma 2 will play an instrumental role in the procedure
for the design of resilient filters proposed in this paper. We
are now in a position to describe this procedure in detail.
Step 1. Stabilization of the detector error dynamics (20) via
output injection: Introduce the following notation:
Ai(t) =
[
A(t) −FiΥi
0 Ωi
]
, Bi =
[
B(t) Fˆi
0 Γˇi
]
,
Ci(t) =
[
Ci(t) 0
]
, Wij(t) =
[
Wij 0
]
, (30)
Lri =
[
Lˆri
Lˇri
]
, Krij =
[
Kˆrij
Kˇrij
]
. (31)
Also, consider positive definite (n + nfi)× (n+ nfi) block-
diagonal matrices Xi, i = 1 . . . , N , partitioned as Xi =[
Xi 0
0 Xi,0
]
, where Xi = X
′
i > 0, X
′
i,0 = Xi,0 > 0 are
respectively n×n and nfi×nfi matrices. In addition, consider
the matrices Φ and ∆ of the form (24), (23):
∆i =
∑
j∈Vi
W ′ijU
−1
ij ZijU
−1
ij Wij , (32)
Φij =


∆i, i = j,
−W ′ijU−1ij Wij , i 6= j, j ∈ Vi,
0 i 6= j, j 6∈ Vi,
(33)
where Z ′ij = Zij and Uij = HˆijHˆ
′
ij + Zij .
Theorem 1: Let a constant γ > 0 and symmetric matrices
Ri > 0, Rˇi > 0, Zij > 0 of dimensions n × n, nfi × nfi ,
pij × pij , respectively, j ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . .N , be selected so
that the following conditions hold:
(a) It holds that
R + γ2(Φ + Φ′ −∆) > 0, Rˇi > Υ′iΥi, (34)
where R = diag[R1, . . . , RN ].
(b) Each differential Riccati equation
Y˙i = AiYi +YiA
′
i +BiB
′
i −Yi
(
C′i(DiD
′
i)
−1Ci
+
∑
j∈Vi
W′ijU
−1
ij Wij −
1
γ2
Ri
)
Yi, Yi(0) = X
−1
i ,(35)
with Ri ,
[
Ri 0
0 Rˇi
]
, has a positive definite symmetric
bounded solution Yi(t) on the interval [0,∞).
Then the system comprised of systems (20) with the coeffi-
cients Lˆri , Kˆ
r
ij , Lˇ
r
i , Kˇ
r
ij , obtained by partitioning the matrices
Lri (t) = Yi(t)Ci(t)
′(Di(t)Di(t)
′)−1(t),
Krij(t) = Yi(t)W
′
iU
−1
ij (36)
according to (31), has the following properties:
(i) In the absence of disturbances and attacks on the con-
trolled observers (8), (17), zi(t), δi(t) vanish exponen-
tially as t→∞, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
(ii) When the network of controlled observers (8), (17)
is subjected to disturbances and/or admissible biasing
attacks of class Fa, all zi(t), δi(t) decay asymptotically
to 0 as t→∞, and (22) holds.
Proof: Using the notation (31) and letting µi = [z
′
i δ
′
i]
′,
wi = [w
′ ν′i]
′, the system (20) can be written as
µ˙i = (Ai(t)− Lri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wij)µi
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wijµj +Bi(t)wi − Lri (t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Vi
Kij(t)
rHˆij vˆij , µi(0) =
[
(x0 − ξi)′ 0′
]′
.
This system is precisely of the form of the system (23)
considered in Lemma 2. Note that in the absence of distur-
bances and attacks, νi = 0 and wi = 0; see (7). Therefore,
claims (i) and (ii) of the theorem can be inferred from the
corresponding claims of Lemma 2. For this, we need to
validate the conditions of that lemma.
To show that condition (a) of Lemma 2 is satisfied, con-
sider the block-diagonal matrix P˜ composed of N diago-
nal (n + nfi) × (n + nfi) blocks P˜i =
[
0 0
0 Υ′iΥi
]
; i.e.,
P˜ = diag[P˜1, . . . , P˜N ]. Let W˜ij = Wij . Then from the
definition of Wij , the matrices ∆˜i, Φ˜ij in (24), (23) are
∆˜i =
[
∆i 0
0 0
]
, Φ˜ij =
[
Φij 0
0 0
]
. The satisfaction of condition
(26) readily follows from (34) if we let R˜i = Ri. Condition
8(b) of Lemma 2 trivially follows from condition (b) of the
theorem if we let A˜i = Ai, C˜i = Ci, X˜i = Xi. 
According to Theorem 1, each node can compute the
matrices Lri , K
r
ij and their components Lˆ
r
i , Kˆ
r
ij , Lˇ
r
i , Kˇ
r
ij on-
line, by solving the respective Riccati equations (35). This
allows to compute the coefficients of the observer (8) and
the controller (17) in real time. The nodes do not need to
communicate to solve these Riccati equations.
Even though statement (iii) of Lemma 2 is not used ex-
plicitly in the proof of Theorem 1, together with the second
inequality (34) Rˇi > Υ
′
iΥi it yields∫
∞
0
‖Υiδi(t)‖2dt < γ2
(
‖z0,i‖2Xi + ‖δ0,i‖2Xi,0
+
∫
∞
0
(
‖w(t)‖2 + ‖νi(t)‖2 + ‖vi(t)‖2
+
∑
j∈Vi
(‖vˆij(t)‖2 + ‖zj(t)‖2Z−1
ij
)
)
dt
)
.
This inequality characterizes the capacity of the attack detector
at node i to attenuate disturbances as well as the impact of
the neighbours’ errors on the detector i’s accuracy. In addition,
the first inequality (34), R+γ2(Φ+Φ′−∆) > 0, ensures that
the interconnections between the detector nodes are balanced
so that the overall system is able to absorb and dissipate the
impact of these errors.
Also note that the first inequality (34) only involves constant
parameters of the interconnections between the systems (17).
It does not involve parameters of the plant and the sensors,
while the second inequality in (34) only involves the output
matrices of the minimal realization of − 1sGi(s) in (13). This
allows to solve the inequality (34) off-line in advance, and
then use its solutions Ri, Rˇi, Zij in (35). Even if some of
the sensors at node i have failed, and the dimension of the
local sensor matrices Ci, Di has changed as a result of this
failure, one can continue using the same matrices Ri, Rˇi, Zij .
The Riccati equation (35) at that node will have to be updated
to include the modified Ci, Di. However, the computation
of the filter gains at other nodes will not be affected. This
is a significant advantage, in comparison with some existing
distributed estimation techniques which require that the entire
network of observers must be recomputed should one of
the sensors have failed. To use this advantage, the matrix
inequality (34) must be solved centrally to assign each node
with suitable matrices Ri, Rˇi
3. This needs to be done only
once at time t = 0; this step can be regarded as an initialization
of the algorithm. Once the matrices Zij are selected, the
inequality (34) becomes a linear matrix inequality with respect
to Ri, i = 1, . . . , N and γ
2. It can be solved numerically using
the existing software. This feature facilitates tuning the local
and global performance of the proposed resilient filter.
Step 2. Design of the resilient distributed observer (8):
From (8), it is clear that the signals ϕi in (16) affect the
3An obvious solution to (34) is Ri = (γ
2λmax(Φ +Φ′ −∆)+ α)I and
Rˇi = (λmax(Υ′iΥi) + α)I , where α > 0 is a constant and λmax(·) is the
largest eigenvalue of a matrix. However not every solution of (34) is suitable.
As noted previously, the matrices Ri and Rˇi must also be selected so that
the differential Riccati equations (35) have bounded solutions.
accuracy of the proposed resilient observer (8). However,
under conditions of Theorem 1, ν˜i = Υiδi is L2-integrable.
Also, νi is L2-integrable, according to Definition 1. Therefore,
the effect of ϕi can be attenuated, along with the effects of L2-
integrable disturbances present in the system. The coefficients
Lri , K
r
ij of the observer (8) which accomplish this task can
also be computed using Lemma 2. To derive these coefficients,
let us re-write the error dynamics (12) of the observer (8) as
e˙i = (A(t) − Lri (t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wij)ei
+
∑
j∈Vi
Krij(t)Wijej +B1,i(t)wi − Lri (t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Vi
Kij(t)
rHijvij , ei(0) = x0 − ξi; (37)
here we used the notation B1,i(t) =
[
B(t) −Fi
]
, wi =[
w′ ϕ′i
]′
. Then Lemma 2 can be applied to the interconnec-
tion of systems (37). As before, consider symmetric matrices
Z¯ij > 0, U¯ij = HijH
′
ij + Z¯ij > 0, j ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . .N , and
define the matrices Φ¯ =
[
Φ¯ij
]N
i,j=1
, ∆¯ = diag[∆¯1, . . . , ∆¯N ]
of the form (24), (23):
∆¯i =
∑
j∈Vi
W ′ijU¯
−1
ij Z¯ijU¯
−1
ij Wij , (38)
Φ¯ij =


∆¯i, i = j,
−W ′ij U¯−1ij Wij , i 6= j, j ∈ Vi,
0 i 6= j, j 6∈ Vi.
(39)
Theorem 2: Suppose condition of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Let a symmetric positive semidefinite Nn×Nn matrix P =
P ′ and a constant γ¯ > 0 be such that there exit symmetric
matrices R¯i > 0, X¯i > 0, Z¯ij > 0, j ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . .N , such
that
(a) The following matrix inequality is satisfied
R¯ + γ¯2(Φ¯ + Φ¯′ − ∆¯) > P, (40)
where R¯ = diag[R¯1, . . . , R¯N ];
(b) Each differential Riccati equation
˙¯Yi = A(t)Y¯i + Y¯iA(t)
′ − Y¯i(Ci(t)′(Di(t)Di(t)′)−1Ci(t)
+
∑
j∈Vi
W ′ij U¯
−1
ij Wij −
1
γ¯2
R¯i)Y¯i +B1,i(t)B1,i(t)
′, (41)
Y¯i(0) = X¯
−1
i ,
has a positive definite symmetric bounded solution Y¯i(t)
on the interval [0,∞).
Then the network of systems (12), with the coefficients Lri ,
Krij , obtained as
Lri (t) = Y¯i(t)Ci(t)
′(Di(t)Di(t)
′)−1,
Krij(t) = Y¯i(t)W
′
ij U¯
−1
ij , (42)
has the following properties:
(i) When w = 0, vi = 0, and vij = 0 for all j ∈ Vi, i ∈ V,
and the system is not under attack, i.e., fi = 0 for all
i ∈ V, every error ei(t) of the distributed observer (12)
vanishes exponentially.
9(ii) In the presence of disturbances and/or when the system is
subjected to a biasing attack of class Fa, ei(t) converge
to 0 asymptotically. Furthermore, it holds that
∫
∞
0
e′Pedt ≤ γ¯2
N∑
i=1
(
‖x0 − ξi‖2X¯i
+
∫
∞
0
(‖w‖2 + ‖vi‖2 + ‖ϕi‖2 +∑
j∈Vi
‖vij‖2
)
dt
)
. (43)
Proof: First consider the case where wi = 0, vi = 0, vij =
0, and fi = 0. Note that the latter assumption implies νi = 0
due to (7). Therefore, in this case wi reduces to wi = [0
′ ν˜′i]
′.
Let Ψ(t, τ) be the state transition matrix of the large scale
system comprised of subsystems (37). Using Lemma 2, we
obtain that ‖Ψ(t, t0)‖ ≤ β0e−λ0(t−t0). Also, in Theorem 1
we have established that the signal ν˜(t) decays exponentially
to 0 when wi = 0, vi = 0, vij = 0, and fi = 0 for all i,
j ∈ Vi. Together these observations imply that the response
of the system to ν˜ = [ν˜′1 . . . ν˜
′
N ]
′ vanishes exponentially, i.e.,
claim (i) of the theorem holds. Statement (ii) follows directly
from Lemma 2. 
Step 3. The complete controlled observer: We now complete
the last step of the design procedure and obtain the remaining
coefficients L¯ri , K¯
r
ij for the controller (17) from (21).
Theorem 3: Suppose the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2
are satisfied. Let the coefficients Lˆri , Kˆ
r
ij , Lˇ
r
i , Kˇ
r
ij of the attack
detecting controllers (17) be obtained from (36), and let Lri ,
Krij be the matrices defined in (42). Define L¯
r
i , K¯
r
ij as
L¯ri = Lˆ
r
i − Lri , K¯rij = Kˆrij −Krij . (44)
Then, the network of state observers (8), augmented with the
network of attack detectors (17)–(19) produces state estimates
xˆi which have the following convergence properties:
(i) In the absence of disturbances and biasing attacks, ‖x−
xˆi‖ → 0 exponentially as t→∞.
(ii) When the plant and/or the network is subject to L2-
integrable disturbances and/or admissible biasing attacks,
the estimates xˆi converge to x asymptotically as t→∞,
and the resilient performance of this observer network is
characterized by the condition∫
∞
0
e′Pedt
≤ γ¯2
N∑
i=1
(
‖x0 − ξi‖2X¯i+2γ2Xi
+(1 + 2γ2)
∫
∞
0
(‖w‖2 + ‖vi‖2 + ∑
j∈Vij
‖vij‖2
)
dt
)
+2γ¯2(1 + γ2)
N∑
i=1
∫
∞
0
‖νi‖2dt; (45)
here P is the matrix from condition (40) of Theorem 2.
(iii) Also, the outputs ui of the distributed controllers (17)
have the following properties:
(a) If the node i is not under attack, the signal ui
generated by the controller (17) at this node vanishes
asymptotically, even in the presence of disturbances.
(b) If node i is subjected to a biasing attack fi of the
class Fa, then
∫
∞
0
‖fi − ui‖2dt <∞.
Proof: Statements (i) and (ii) of the theorem follow from
Theorems 1 and 2. The inequality (45) is proved by combining
(22) and (43) using the inequality ‖ϕi‖2 ≤ 2(‖νi‖2 +
‖Υiδi‖2).
To prove statement (iii)a, we note that if node i is not under
attack, we have fˆi(t) = 0 and νi(t) = 0, therefore ǫi(t) = 0.
Further, we have established in Theorem 1 that in the presence
of disturbances, δi(t)→ 0 as t→∞ asymptotically. Therefore
in this case, ui = Υiǫˆi = −Υiδi vanishes to fi = 0
asymptotically as t→∞.
When the observer at node i is subjected to a biasing attack
and fi 6= 0, then νi 6= 0, however νi ∈ L2[0,∞) according
to Definition 1. Also, it has been established in Theorem 1
that Υiδi ∈ L2[0,∞). Thus,
∫
∞
0
‖fi−ui‖2dt <∞, i.e., (iii)b
holds. 
D. Performance optimization over communication graphs: an
LTI case
As mentioned, the proposed procedure allows each node
to compute the coefficients Lri , K
r
ij of its observers and
the parameters L¯ri , K¯
r
ij , Lˇ
r
i , Kˇ
r
ij of its controllers without
communicating with other nodes. This is because each node
solves its Riccati equations (35) and (41) locally. For this, each
node must be assigned with constants γ2, γ¯2 and matrices Ri,
R¯i, Zij , Z¯ij . A deeper look into the matrix inequalities (34),
(40) reveals that the selection of these matrices and constants
is constrained by the network topology. The simplest way to
see this is to restrict attention to case where the matrices A,
B, Ci and Di are constant, the communications between the
network nodes are noise-free, and the node observers transmit
their complete estimates xˆi. In this case, the communication
model (3), (18) simplifies to cij = xˆj , ηij = eˆj for all j ∈ Vi,
i = 1, . . . , N ; i.e.,Wij = I , Hˆij = 0. Also, let Zij = Z¯ij = I .
With these parameters, we have
∆i = ∆¯i = diI, Φ = Φ¯ = L ⊗ I, (46)
where di, L denote the in-degree of node i and the
Laplace matrix of the network graph, respectively. Let D =
diag[d1, . . . , dN ] be the in-degree matrix of the network graph.
Conditions (34), (40) can then be explicitly expressed in terms
of the Laplace and in-degree matrices of the graph G:
R+ γ2(L + L ′ −D)⊗ I > 0, Rˇi > Υ′iΥi,
R¯+ γ¯2(L + L ′ −D)⊗ I > P. (47)
These constraints can be used to select the communication
topology which endows the controlled distributed observer
(8), (17)–(19) with an optimized estimation accuracy or an
optimized biasing attack detection performance.
Optimization of the attack detection performance: Let
{Gm,m = 1, . . . ,M} be a given collection of admissible
communication graphs. From now, we will use the subscript
m to denote quantities corresponding to the graph Gm from
this set; i.e., Lm will denote the Laplace matrix of Gm, etc.
The optimized disturbance attenuation among attack detectors
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(17)–(19) interconnected over the admissible graphs Gm is
expressed as
min
Gm
(inf γ2), (48)
where the infimum is taken over the set of matrices R¯i, Ri,
Rˇi, i = 1, . . . , N , and constants γ
2, γ¯2 which satisfy the
conditions of Theorem 3 stated for the graph Gm. In the H∞
theory, a filter delivering optimal disturbance attenuation is
usually difficult to compute, and a standard practice is to use
suboptimal H∞ filters [2], [31]. Therefore, we seek to find
a resilient distributed observer with an optimized suboptimal
attack detection performance.
Initially, let us restrict attention to the simplified time-
invariant case. In addition to the assumptions made above,
we assume that (A,B) is stabilizable. With this addi-
tional assumption, [29, Theorem 2] states that the net-
work of observers connected over an admissible graph Gm
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3 provided the fol-
lowing Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) in the variables
({R¯i, Ri, Rˇi,Qi, Q¯i}Mi=1, γ2, γ¯2) are feasible:
R + γ2(Lm + L
′
m −Dm)⊗ I > 0, Rˇi > Υ′iΥi,
R¯ + γ¯2(Lm + L
′
m −Dm)⊗ I > P,

A′iQi +QiAi +Ri
−
[
γ2(C′i(DiD
′
i)
−1Ci + di,mI) 0
0 0
]
QiBi
B′iQi −γ2I

 < 0,

 A
′Qi +QiA+ R¯i
−γ¯2 (C′i(DiD′i)−1Ci + di,mI) QiB1,i
B′1,iQi −γ¯2I

 < 0,
Qi = Q
′
i > 0, Ri = R
′
i > 0,
Qi = Q
′
i > 0, R¯i = R¯
′
i > 0, (i = 1, . . . , N), (49)
where di,m is the cardinality of i’s neighborhood V
m
i in the
graph Gm. Indeed, the first two lines are the inequalities (47)
particularized for the graph Gm, and the remaining conditions
guarantee that the corresponding differential Riccati equations
(35), (41) do not have a conjugate point [2].
The following sequential optimization procedure provides
a tractable upper bound on (48) which yields a desired
suboptimal attack detector. Let γ◦0 = +∞, and for every
m = 1, . . . ,M , define γ2m = inf γ
2 where the infimum is
taken over the feasible set of the LMIs (49). If these LMIs are
not feasible for a particular m, we set γ2m = +∞. Then let
γ◦m = min(γm, γ
◦
m−1), m = 1, . . . ,M. (50)
Since the sequence {γ◦m} is monotone decreasing, the re-
cursion (50) terminates at the graph Gm which attains
minGm(γ
◦
m)
2 = minGm γ
2
m. Also, since feasibility of the
LMIs (49) is only a sufficient condition for the conditions
of Theorem 3 to be satisfied, then for every m, γ2m is greater
than or equal to the inner infimum value in (48). Therefore, the
graph Gm which attains minGm(γ
◦
m)
2 is the most favorable
graph among the candidate graphs {Gm}, from the view point
of suboptimal attack detection performance.
Optimization of resilient estimation performance: The fore-
going procedure is readily modified to obtain a network
topology yielding a suboptimal level of disturbance attenuation
γ¯2 in (43). Define γ¯2m = inf γ¯
2 where the infimum is taken
over the feasible set of the LMIs (49). Then the recursion
γ¯◦m = min(γ¯m, γ¯
◦
m−1), m = 1, . . . ,M. (51)
terminates at the graph which attains the desired suboptimal
network configuration.
General time-invariant case: The optimization procedures
proposed above are applicable in the general case where
the communications between the nodes are described by the
general model (3), (18). We still assume that the matrices Zij ,
Z¯ij are given and that the pair (A,B) is stabilizable. Then γ
2
and γ¯2 can be optimized subject to a series of linear matrix
inequalities, similar to (49). In lieu of the first three inequalities
in (49), this series of LMIs includes the original inequalities
(34) and (40) involving the appropriately defined matrices
Φm + Φm −∆m and Φ¯m + Φ¯m − ∆¯m which are associated
with the admissible candidate network topology Gm. Also,
the remaining matrix inequalities in (49) are replaced with
the corresponding more general LMIs reflecting the general
structure of communications

A′iQi +QiAi +Ri
−γ2
(
C′i(DiD
′
i)
−1Ci +
∑
j∈Vm
i
W′ijU
−1
ij Wij
)
QiBi
B′iQi −γ2I

 < 0,


A′Qi +QiA+ R¯i
−γ¯2
(
C′i(DiD
′
i)
−1Ci +
∑
j∈Vm
i
W ′ijU
−1
ij Wij
)
QiB1,i
B′1,iQi −γ¯2I

 < 0,
Qi = Q
′
i > 0, Ri = R
′
i > 0,
Qi = Q
′
i > 0, R¯i = R¯
′
i > 0, (i = 1, . . . , N), (52)
The optimization over the set of graphs can then be performed
recursively, in the same way as in the previous cases.
Suitable candidate graphs: Our final remarks are concerned
with selecting suitable candidate graphs Gm for optimization.
The feasibility of the proposed optimization procedure relies
onH∞ stabilizability of the large-scale interconnected systems
(20) and (37) via output injection. In turn, this stabilizability
property requires the corresponding noise-free large-scale sys-
tems to have a basic distributed detectability property; see [23]
for a more detailed discussion. For observer networks with
identical matrices Wij = W , this property requires that the
plant must be detectable from the combined outputs associated
with each maximal subgraphs spanned by a tree [23] or
with each strongly connected subgraph that does not have
incoming edges [16], [12], [28]. In addition, within each such
subgraph, every state of the plant must be either detectable
from the measurements or observable through interconnections
(or both)4. Although we did not state these properties explicitly
in this paper, they are necessary for stabilizability of the
4Observability through interconnections holds trivially in [16], [28], [9]
since these references assumeW = I . In [12], the matricesWij were selected
to ensure that each node receives from its neighbors the part of the state vector
undetectable from its local measurements.
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large-scale interconnected systems (20) and (37) via output
injection. In particular, a necessary condition for detectability
of biasing attacks by detectors of the form (17) obtained in [6]
is based on these properties. Therefore, each candidate graph
Gm must satisfy these necessary conditions for stablizability
via output injection, at least when the system is time-invariant,
and the matrices Wij are identical
5. We are not aware of
similar necessary conditions for distributed detectability of
time-varying systems, and in this case the problem of char-
acterizing distributed detectability as well as detectability of
biasing attacks appears to remain open.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The example is based on the example from [22], where a
distributed observer was constructed for the system of the form
(1), with B = 0.1I and
A =


0.3775 0 0 0 0 0
0.2959 0.3510 0 0 0 0
1.4751 0.6232 1.0078 0 0 0
0.2340 0 0 0.5596 0 0
0 0 0 0.4437 1.1878 −0.0215
0 0 0 0 2.2023 1.0039


.
The plant is observed by 6 sensors. Sensor i measures the i-th
and (i + 1)-th coordinates of the state vector, with sensor 6
measuring the 6th and 1st coordinates; see [22] for the defini-
tions of the matrices Ci. All 6 pairs (A,Ci) are not detectable
in this example. Also, Di = 0.01I ∀i. As in [22], suppose that
the nodes broadcast the full vector xˆi, i.e.,W = I , however the
communications between the nodes are subject to disturbances,
so we let Hij = Hc,ij = (0.1/
√
2)× [1 1 1 1 1 1]′.
The problem in [22] was to achieve a robust H∞ con-
sensus performance of the observers, which corresponds to
P = (L + LT) ⊗ I; here L , LT are the Laplace matrices
of G and its transpose graph, respectively. We now consider
a resilient version of that problem. As in [6], suppose that
Fi = [1 1 1 1 1 1]
′, Fˆi = 0 ∀i. Next we selected Gi(s) =
410
s+40 . Formally, the algorithm imposes mild requirements
on these transfer functions — any proper rational transfer
function of the form
N(s)
D(s) I which renders the transfer function
(sI + Gi(s))
−1G(s) stable can be selected as Gi(s). Some
additional considerations in regard to selecting these transfer
functions are as follows. Firstly, it is reasonable to keep the
energy in the approximation error νi to a minimum if possible,
since it appears on the right hand side of the performance
inequality (43). For this, the system (7) should be sufficiently
fast and have no overshoots. Secondly, the differential Ric-
cati equation (35) must admit a bounded solution with an
acceptably small γ, to guarantee an acceptable robustness of
attack detection; see (22). This can be accomplished by either
simulating those equations offline or, in the time-invariant
case, by testing that the third LMI condition (49) is feasible. In
accordance with these recommendations, in this example we
let Zij = Z¯ij = 0.01× I and solved the LMI conditions (49)
to obtain the smallest γ2, γ¯2 for which the LMIs (49) were
5The extension of the results of [23] for the case where Wij = Wi can
be found in [24].
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Fig. 1: Errors of the original observers (4) from [22] (Fig.(a))
and the controlled observers (8) (Fig.(b)) under the biasing
attack. The inset shows the zoom-up plots of the transients in
the interval t ∈ [3.9, 4.3].
feasible, γ2 = 6.9113 × 10−3, γ¯2 = 3.4511 × 10−2, and
obtained the corresponding matrices Ri, Rˇi and R¯i from (49)
to be used in the Riccati equations (35) and (41). To be
consistent with the original example from [22], we consider
only one network topology, hence we did not need to perform
optimization over a collection of graphs.
Next, the plant and the resilient observers (8) endowed with
the controllers (17)–(19) were jointly simulated. An attack
input of amplitude 5 and duration 3 seconds was applied to the
plant observer at node 2 at time t = 4. No other disturbances
were applied; this made the comparison between the errors
of the original observer (4) from [22] and the errors of the
observers (8) operating under the attack most vivid; see plots
in Fig. 1. As can be seen from these plots, the observers
from [22] designed without consideration for resilience were
adversely affected by the attack. In contrast, the controlled
observers (8) were able to successfully negate the biasing
effect of the attack. Their errors have only short transients at
the beginning and the end of the attack interval, which decay
quite quickly; the decay rate was adjusted by choosing the
transfer functions Gi(s). Figure 2 shows the corresponding
outputs ui of the controllers. One can see that the attack at
node 2 has been detected successfully.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper has proposed a novel class of controlled dis-
tributed observers for robust estimation of a linear plant, which
are resilient to biasing misappropriation attacks. To counter
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Fig. 2: Outputs of the attack detectors ϕi(t). The solid line
shows the attack input, and the colored dashed lines show the
detector outputs.
the attacks, we introduce an auxiliary network of distributed
output feedback controllers which provide an attack correcting
action to the main observer. The filter components of these
controllers can also serve as attack detectors. Our problem
formulation is quite general in that it captures biasing attack
scenarios which target both the observer and the attack detector
at the compromised nodes.
The proposed design method is based on the methodology
of distributed H∞ filtering; it allows to obtain observers
which attenuate benign disturbances, while discovering and
suppressing biasing inputs. This approach allows to consider
the worst-case situation where every node of the observer
network can be subjected to an attack. When the defender
knows a priori that certain nodes are secure (e.g., as a result
of a security audit), this information can be easily incorporated
into the design procedure by assigning zero values to the
corresponding attack input matrices Fi, Fˇi.
Another feature of our approach is that the nodes compute
their observers and attack detectors independently from each
other. This decentralization of computation enhances security
of the network since the computation does not rely on poten-
tially vulnerable communications.
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